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Les Mains Sales Versus Le Sale Monde: 
A Metaethical Look at Dirty Hands 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The phenomenon of “dirty hands” is typically framed as an issue for normative or applied 
ethical consideration—for example, in debates between consequentialism and non-
consequentialism, or in discussions of the morality of torture or political expediency. By 
contrast, this paper explores the metaethical dimensions of dirty-hands situations. First, 
empirically-informed arguments based on scenarios of moral dilemmas involving 
metaethical aspects of dirty hands are marshaled against the view that “ought implies 
can.” Second, a version of moral realism is conjoined with a version of value-pluralism 
that charitably accommodates and explains the central features of the phenomenology 
related to dirty hands. It is not simply that agents are or are not justified in getting their 
hands dirty (les mains sales); rather, in certain situations, it is the nature of the moral 
domain itself to be intractably messy (le sale monde), such that dirty hands are 
unavoidable. The paper concludes by considering some important normative and 
psychological implications of this view. 
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I. Introduction 
 The phenomenon of “dirty hands” is frequently framed in the context of primarily 
normative considerations. In this way, the issue is typically analyzed by posing questions 
such as whether it is ever morally justified to perform an action which is ceteris paribus 
morally suspicious (if not downright impermissible) for the sake of bringing about a 
greater overall good. Thus, scenarios of dirty hands are useful “intuition-pumps” to probe 
the distinctions between consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethical frameworks. 
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For example, Utilitarianism might be motivated by a somber view of the necessity of 
getting one’s hands dirty, whereas Kantianism might be expressed by reference to the 
corrupting nature of an over-willingness to compromise firm moral standards. Similarly, 
dirty-hands style thought-experiments are also often associated with particular scenarios 
in applied ethics—for example, in discussions of the ethics of torture, lying, war, capital 
punishment and abortion. 
 What has received mush less attention, by contrast, have been the metaethical 
implications of dirty hands. That is, what if anything do scenarios of dirty hands suggest 
about the nature of morality itself? The purpose of this paper is to explore the metaethical 
commitments implicit in such scenarios, and to lay out a metaethical theory capable of 
accommodating these commitments. Specifically, I will consider arguments that a 
charitable and empirically-informed look at the phenomenon of dirty hands undermines 
any strong version of the “ought-implies-can” precept. On the basis of such arguments, I 
will defend a form of metaethical realism that I believe constitutes the best explanation of 
dirty hands. Ultimately, I argue for a “pluralistic” form of realism according to which 
some instances of dirty hands may be due to intractable moral dilemmas generated by 
mutually exclusive, but nonetheless realist moral values. If such a view is feasible, then 
an aspect of dirty hands which is usually attributed as a property of agents (les mains 
sales) can be reconceived as a property of a world that is itself morally dirty (le sale 
monde). 
 
II. Varieties of Dirty Hands 
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 Not all situations of dirty hands necessarily have obvious metaethical 
significance. For example, one form of dirty hands occurs in scenarios in which an agent 
subverts a moral principle or consideration for the sake of another good.1 This other 
privileged good need not be a moral good—as in situations in which someone tells a 
“white lie” in order to escape embarrassment, spies on someone solely for personal 
curiosity or voyeurism, or cheats on a test simply for expediency. In other words, these 
situations of dirty hands involve “cutting corners” with moral principles. I take it that the 
worry about this form of dirty hands is twofold: on the one (dirty) hand, an agent 
reasoning in such a manner is easily susceptible to a slippery-slope in which justifying 
increasingly egregious moral violations—“just this once”—becomes easier as de-
sensitization and the psychological pressure to act consistently with previous actions 
build momentum. On the other (dirty) hand, there is a related worry that if the firm 
universality of moral principles is allowed to be sacrificed in any situation, it could easily 
be sacrificed in every situation on the basis of subjective, self-serving rationales. This 
form of moral dirty hands—namely, when an agent bends or breaks a moral consideration 
for the sake of a competing non-moral good—is surely a fascinating phenomenon that 
deserves serious attention; but it is primarily a psychological issue, not a metaethical one. 
 Compare the above type of dirty-hands scenario with a situation in which an agent 
subverts a moral consideration for the sake of another moral consideration. For example, 
let us assume that not lying is an uncontroversial moral obligation ceteris paribus. It is 
easy to imagine a situation in which lying is the only mode of avoiding a greater moral 
evil—say, the suffering of ten innocent people. A common way to present the issue of 
dirty hands is as a conflict of just this sort: there are two moral considerations, each of 
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which are ceteris paribus obligatory, but each of which is also mutually exclusive at a 
practical level. Pace a very rigorous form of deontology, it seems plausible that many 
people would not have too much difficulty legitimizing the sacrifice of truth-telling for 
the sake of preventing so much needless suffering. In such a case, although the agent in 
such a moral dilemma would have to dirty his or her hands by telling a lie, the second 
good (viz. preventing suffering) might be thought to outweigh or override the first good 
(viz. telling the truth). Or it might not, and we might insist that lying constitutes such an 
egregious moral wrong that it can never be justified. Regardless of how we view this 
conflict, though, it is essentially a normative question and need not by itself raise 
metaethical concerns. 
 By contrast, to see how metaethical considerations may arise in vis-à-vis dirty 
hands, consider a third form of moral dilemma: a case in which a moral consideration 
competes with another, mutually exclusive moral consideration (as in the above 
example), but where neither consideration can be out-ranked or overridden by the other. 
Instances of this oft-ignored variety of dirty hands have been offered under the guise of 
“trolley problems” since Philippa Foot popularized the genre.2 For example, consider 
Bernard Williams’ depiction of poor Jim who finds himself in a situation in which he 
must choose between killing one innocent person himself or allowing another man to kill 
twenty innocent people; or J.J. Thomson’s infamous scenario of a runaway train whose 
conductor must choose between allowing the train to continue on its course, thereby 
killing five people, or derailing the train to kill just one person instead.3 
 Such trolley-scenarios are a basic food group for nourishing debates about the 
difference between active and passive actions, the so-called doctrine of double effect, and 
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the neurological and emotional correlates of the decision-procedures that are involved in 
responding to such scenarios.4 All such analyses are essentially normative in focus. 
Indeed, Williams’ presentation of Jim’s dirty hands is articulated explicitly in the context 
of a critique against one normative theory (Utilitarianism) in favor of another (Virtue 
Ethics) which he believes can better accommodate the importance of integrity in Jim’s 
situation. Most other trolley-style thought-experiments are designed to probe similar 
normative questions. For example, are passive allowances less culpable than active 
performances? Are outcomes which are foreseen, but not directly desired relevant to 
ascriptions of moral blame and praise? What are the roles of emotional factors in moral 
response and decision-making? These are very important normative questions, but what 
is interesting about such scenarios from a metaethical perspective is what, if anything, 
they reveal about the structure of moral values and the messiness of the moral domain 
itself. 
 Two important clarifications need to be made at this point before considering any 
further metaethical analysis. First, I do not mean to suggest that there is any unbridgeable 
schism between the three types of moral conflict described above. Obviously, the 
domains of moral psychology, normative theory, and metaethics cannot and should not be 
completely separated: considerations from one domain have important implications for 
other domains. Indeed, the argument in subsequent sections will utilize precisely such a 
relationship—arguing in favor of a metaethical position in an effort to charitably 
accommodate certain psychological data, and in a manner that yields practical normative 
results.5 My point in distinguishing these three varieties of dirty hands is simply to point 
out that metaethical considerations are often neglected in analyses of dirty hands, where 
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psychological and normative dimensions are instead privileged. Thus, although it is 
metaethics that are of central importance in the third scenario of dirty hands (i.e. in which 
conflict is generated by mutually exclusive, but equally-obliging moral considerations) 
this is not to say that such a scenario does not also raise its own psychological and 
normative issues. 
 A second point to address is whether we are justified in believing that moral 
dilemmas of this third variety exist at all. Despite a ubiquity of fictional examples 
(explored in more detail in the next section), many theorists have found it quite 
controversial that two or more moral considerations could intractably conflict. Consider 
Kant’s stark assertion that, “a conflict of duties and obligations is inconceivable 
(obligationes non colliduntur).”6 John Stuart Mill expressed a similar conviction: “If 
utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be invoked to decide 
between them when their demands are incompatible.”7 The pressure on both Kant and 
Mill to deny the possibility of fundamental moral dilemmas presumably stemmed from 
their theoretic commitments to singular principles of morality which could 
algorithmically decide between two options.8 
 However, there is also a more basic anxiety generated by taking such fundamental 
moral dilemmas seriously—namely, that agents could find themselves in situations where 
they are morally responsible for unavoidable wrongdoing, which does not seem “fair.” 
This anxiety is closely connected to the familiar “ought-implies-can” principle, about 
which I shall have more to say in the subsequent section. Specifically, I shall argue that 
the application of the principle of charity to our actual moral experience provides strong 
warrant for mediating this commitment to fairness. For the present, though, the argument 
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only requires the recognition that at least prima facie attention be given to apparent 
situations of incommensurable conflict as a datum requiring explanation.9 
 With these caveats in mind, we may summarize the discussion so far: situations of 
dirty hands can be differentiated into at least three distinct varieties. Bending or breaking 
a moral principle, or subverting a moral consideration, might occur for any of the 
following reasons: (1) First, an agent might dirty his or her hands by subverting a moral 
consideration for the sake of a competing non-moral good, e.g. lying to escape 
embarrassment or for expediency. This form of moral dirty hands is primarily a 
psychological matter. (2) Second, an agent might dirty his or her hands by subverting a 
moral consideration for the sake of a competing moral good that out-ranks or overrides it, 
e.g. lying to bring about a greater moral good. This form of dirty hands is essentially an 
issue for normative theory to address. (3) And third, an agent might dirty his or her hands 
morally by subverting a moral consideration for the sake of a competing moral good that 
does not out-rank or override it, nor is out-ranked or overridden by it. Although this third 
type of situation raises a host of psychological and normative questions, it also uniquely 
raises metaethical issues. I turn to an analysis of such issues now. 
 
III. “Dammit, Jim!” 
 A large part of the fascination with the sort of dirty hands that arise in Williams’ 
and Thomson’s examples is the perennial fascination with tragedy. After all, part of what 
arouses the complex, but potentially cathartic response of fear and pity which Aristotle 
identified in the reception of classical tragedy is a recognition that certain situations 
present impossible options for anyone unlucky enough to be trapped in them. The tragedy 
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in Sophocles’ Antigone, Shakespeare’s Hamlet, or William Styron’s Sophie’s Choice is 
that the central characters cannot help but get their hands dirty morally. Antigone must 
either violate a perceived moral duty to her deceased brother (as well as the gods) or 
violate a moral duty to her king and uncle; Hamlet must either allow the injustice of 
letting his father’s murderer to go unpunished or bring ruin upon himself and the state; 
and Sophie of course must either sacrifice her son Jan or her daughter Eva (or both). 
Non-action is not a conceptually available option. These situations are, to borrow 
William James’ terminology, “living, forced, and momentous.” 
 Examples of truly tragic scenarios of dirty hands are ubiquitous in literature and 
film. Of course, it may be the case that such dirty moral dilemmas capture our 
imagination in the way they do because they are (thankfully) rare occurrences in the 
everyday life of most people. For this reason, it might be objected that they are of 
questionable “ecological validity,” representing unrealistic, romanticized, and 
sensationalized possibilities about which everyday agents have no clear or reliable 
intuitions at all.10 Such reasoning, though, would fail to explain why the tragedies of 
Antigone and Sophie resonate as deeply as they do: why else would we return to tragedy 
unless it proffered a possibility or expressed an anxiety to which we could relate? 
Furthermore, there may be compelling reason to believe that deep-rooted moral conflicts 
are more commonplace than many agents would like to acknowledge. For example, 
becoming cognizant of the challenges of global warming or world hunger will quite 
arguably engender a sensitivity to the tragic depth and real enormity of the issues. It may 
become difficult to see how we are not dirtying our hands any time we order an 
unnecessary appetizer for dinner or use gasoline while driving on vacation.11 
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 To highlight the metaethical aspect of moral tragedies, let us return to Williams’ 
scenario of Jim who, recall, is being forced to decide between killing one person or 
letting twenty people be killed. There are obviously interesting psychological and 
normative questions of what desiderata go (or should go) through Jim’s mind, whether he 
responds emotionally or rationally, what parts of his brain become activated during his 
deliberation and response, and what normative theory best captures our intuitions about 
which option Jim should choose. But even a complete analysis of all these issues would, I 
believe, neglect one important dimension of the phenomenology of Jim’s dilemma—
namely, that it is inescapable. No matter which option Jim chooses, nor which normative 
theory we prefer, Jim cannot escape from the tragedy of being confronted with two 
incommensurable moral considerations. His tragedy is that each moral consideration—
viz. not killing an innocent person and not letting twenty innocent people be killed—is 
individually compelling and ceteris paribus obligatory. A normative theory which 
attempts to defuse this conflict by privileging one consideration over another would seem 
to miss the poignancy of Jim’s plight. He is damned if he does and damned if he doesn’t. 
It will matter not at all whether a Utilitarian tells him that he is required to kill the one to 
save the twenty, nor whether a Kantian tells him it is permissible to passively allow the 
twenty to die provided he does not violate the categorical imperative by actively killing 
the one; the situation has tragically forced Jim’s hands to become dirtied no matter what 
he decides. 
 Indeed, we would regard Jim as morally deficient were he to calmly explain his 
reasoning in favor of either of the options by appealing to a normative theory that 
justified his decision, and then go confidently on his way with no feelings of guilt. In 
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other words, it seems appropriate to say that were Jim not to feel as if his hands had been 
dirtied by his unavoidable participation in the encounter—even though he could not 
prevent it—it would reflect very poorly on his character. Williams himself has made a 
similar point about Jim’s situation, and has stressed that it may be impossible for Jim to 
solve his dilemma “without remainder” in this way.12 
 The difference between Williams’ account and my own concerns how best to 
characterize the emotion that constitutes such a remainder. For Williams, this emotion is 
best described as a species of regret. However, this characterization appears insufficient 
since regret is an emotion that may be felt impersonally—that is, one need not feel 
personally responsible in order to regret that something is the case.13 And it is precisely 
the personalization of moral dirtiness that I am arguing reflects positively on Jim’s 
reaction to his dilemma. While I agree with Williams’ insight that Jim is left with a 
“remainder,” I argue that this emotional residue is best analyzed as guilt, which better 
captures the personalization requirement.14 
 How people emotionally respond to situations where external states of affairs 
seem to conspire to force them to dirty their hands is often more important to our moral 
assessment of them than their particular actions themselves.15 To appreciate this point, 
consider Jim’s dilemma as expressed as an exclusive disjunction, where “A” abbreviates 
the option “kill one innocent person” and “B” abbreviates the option “let twenty innocent 
people be killed,” such that: 
 
(A v B) & ~ (A & B) 
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I argue that we morally admire those individuals most who respond in a personalized way 
to the disjunction itself, regardless of which specific disjunct they end up acting upon. 
Whether Jim acts on “A” or acts on “B”, he ought to (and probably will) feel morally bad 
about failing to act on the other option excluded by his choice. 
 This is to say that Jim should feel bad because his hands are dirty regardless of 
how they became dirty or whether their being dirty was preventable. It will no doubt 
strike many as unfair that we should be this hard on Jim. After all, the fact that he is in 
such a plight in the first place seems a matter of arbitrary bad “moral luck.”16 And a 
deeply-rooted precept in normative theorizing is that agents can only be properly held 
morally accountable for actions that they have deliberative control over: the so-called 
“ought implies can” dictum.17 
 However, the “ought implies can” principle has come under recent scrutiny 
precisely on the grounds of its phenomenological inaccuracy.18 After all, individuals 
regarded as moral exemplars often report feelings of personal guilt for failing to perform 
actions which were rendered impossible due to the nature of the dilemma. Nor is it the 
case that these feelings of guilt are disadvantageous byproducts of an exemplar’s hyper-
developed moral sensibility. Recent experimental research has suggested that guilt—even 
when it violates the “ought implies can” principle—has a great deal of positive 
motivational efficacy. For instance, a recent study by David Amodio, et al. (2007) 
concluded that racial guilt can be associated with positive changes in moral motivation 
and behavior. Specifically, Amodio targeted the phenomenon of “white-guilt”— feelings 
of guilt on the part of a white individual for racial injustices committed by other whites 
historically. White test-subjects who had expressed deep moral concern for the treatment 
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of blacks were shown a multiracial series of faces while brain activity was monitored. 
Counterfeit results were then given to the subjects falsely indicating that their brain 
activity had evidenced biased responses against black faces. Although this caused 
feelings of guilt in the subjects (who were of course debriefed after the conclusion of the 
experiment), when presented with opportunities to engage in prejudice-reducing activities 
(e.g. reading anti-bias educational literature or volunteering for racial-awareness events), 
they responded with greater than normal alacrity. 
 The Amodio study is a perfect expression of the type of tragic dilemmas that have 
metaethical relevance for dirty hands because a white individual need not be personally 
responsible for the actions about which he or she nonetheless feels guilty—he or she is 
placed in a tragic social environment of inherited racial privilege and may feel “guilty” 
about this even if he or she is not otherwise personally biased or prejudicial. In this way, 
as Bas van Fraassen has argued, tragic moral dilemmas embody a type of “original sin.”19 
 The history of normative theory is largely one of resistance to this type of tragic 
dirty hands. And with good reason: if part of the impetus for normative theorizing is to 
provide some sort of practical guidance about how to live and what to do, then allowing 
for the possibility that our hands can sometimes get morally dirty no matter what we 
choose threatens to render normative theorizing impractical.20 Consider a popular 
expression of precisely this resistance: in the movie Star Trek II: The Wrath of Kahn, the 
commanding officer of the starship Enterprise is confronted with a training exercise in 
which she must choose between allowing the crew of an allied ship to die or else protect 
them by violating a treaty and potentially starting a war. This exercise is dubbed the 
“Kobayashi Maru Test,” after the eponymous ship in distress. Unbeknownst to the 
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officer, this exercise has been rigged as a tragic moral dilemma, expressible as the sort of 
exclusive disjunction described above. Whichever option she chooses, the training 
program will respond by rendering a morally unacceptable outcome: if she chooses to 
save the allied ship, her own crew will die and a war will be initiated; and if she chooses 
to abandon the allied ship, its crew will die. As in Williams’ situation with Jim, the 
officer must get her hands dirty regardless of which option she chooses because the very 
nature of the exercise has been predetermined to be morally messy. 
 As James T. Kirk later makes clear, the exercise is less a test of what the officer 
should do—since, after all, she should perform each of the mutually exclusive actions, 
which is impossible—and is more an assessment of how she responds to the inevitability 
of getting her hands dirty. Of course, the officer understandingly continues to question 
not only her actual decision, but the very legitimacy of the tragic disjunction itself. The 
history of normative theory reveals a similar resistance in the form of continual attempts 
to identify some over-arching principle or value that could algorithmically ground a finite 
decision-procedure, capable of resolving any moral dilemma. Kirk’s own actions 
(revealed later in the movie) embody a similar faith: he “solves” the Kobayashi Maru 
dilemma only by rewriting the program to allow for a single solution with no casualties. 
This is a version of the familiar trope of the super-powered comic book hero who is able 
to perform both options in an exclusive disjunction which, for mere mortals, would be 
impossible. 
 I suspect that the reason why we relegate such fantastic resolutions of moral 
dilemmas to the realms of science fiction, fantasy, and comic books is because we 
recognize the fact that real-life is much messier than we would prefer. Captain Kirk and 
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other heroes of fiction can preserve the pristine cleanliness of their characters by utilizing 
the resources of their idealized worlds. The real world, by contrast, all too often forces us 
to get our hands dirty despite our best intentions and our most careful analyses. Whereas 
the fictional hero is great because he or she always finds a way to avoid dirty hands, real-
world heroes are great when they respond in sensitive ways to the inescapable 
metaethical reality of dirty hands. 
 To summarize this section, it has been argued that certain moral dilemmas are 
uncomfortably ineliminable, such that agents cannot escape getting their hands dirty. The 
moral dirtiness of the world itself (le sale monde) is what tragically forces us to dirty our 
own hands (les mains sales). I have argued that this messiness in the moral domain 
cannot be eliminated or avoided despite very strong theoretic as well as existential 
pressure to do so, and that a certain sense of personal guilt in response to it is appropriate 
and praiseworthy (as well as motivationally efficacious). In the subsequent section, I turn 
to a more detailed discussion of a metaethical theory capable of accommodating this view 
of dirty hands. 
 
 
IV. Filthy, Dirty Moral Realism 
 
 It might be thought that the simplest explanation of the moral messiness argued 
for in the previous section would be to embrace some version of metaethical relativism. 
In other words, it could be that the reason why clean-cut moral distinctions and principles 
fail is because they represent interest-driven human conventions, constructed and 
projected onto the world to address particular cultural factors and challenges. Since these 
cultural factors and challenges will obviously vary between cultures, the respective 
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conventions and attitudes that arise as a result of them will ipso facto vary as well. Moral 
dilemmas, according to this line of reasoning, result from the conflict of one or more 
conventions which themselves arose for distinct purposes.21 
 David Wong has provided an influential and powerful defense of a version of just 
such a view, which he calls “pluralistic moral relativism.”22 To motivate this view, Wong 
adopts a causal-historical theory of reference, according to which a statement’s meaning 
is established by some initial “dubbing ceremony.” Since different dubbing ceremonies 
will yield different meanings, reference transmission can thus result in a plurality of 
extensions for moral predicates. What is essential for Wong (in order to distinguish his 
sophisticated view from a cruder “anything-goes” relativism) is that this plurality of 
moral extensions is largely constrained by the conjunction of the coordinative function of 
morality with the biological nature of humans. Since there are only so many ways to 
successfully coordinate intra- and interpersonal conflict in consonance with our 
biological needs, the number of acceptable reference-fixing descriptions will not be 
infinite. 
 This is not the place to adequately assess the strengths and weaknesses of Wong’s 
pluralistic moral relativism. Instead, I want to sketch an alternative understanding of the 
metaethics of moral dilemmas that is compatible with moral realism. Specifically, I want 
to defend a pluralistic moral realism that better accommodates the phenomenology of 
tragic dirty hands described in the previous section. 
By “moral realism” I mean to refer to the view that: (1) moral statements are 
truth-apt (a.k.a. cognitivism); (2) at least some of these statements are in fact true; and (3) 
to say that a statement is “true” is to say that it bears a correspondence to features of the 
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world which exist independently of the evidence or beliefs of anyone (or of everyone, or 
even of epistemically idealized agents). I think this definition of moral realism is 
relatively uncontroversial and is non-committal with respect to more specific metaethical 
debates—such as the nature of moral knowledge, moral motivation, or even which moral 
propositions are actually the true ones. Note, though, that this definition does exclude as 
genuinely realist any view which interprets truth according to non-correspondence 
theories. Thus, for instance, sophisticated non-cognitivist accounts which preserve moral 
“truth” by reference to deflationary or minimalist theories of truth are not legitimate 
expressions of moral realism proper.23 Of course, a fully satisfactory account of moral 
realism will need to specify these further commitments and defend realism from its 
numerous objections—viz. that it is metaphysically spooky, unable to articulate a 
parsimonious ontology of value, epistemologically quietistic, and unable to account for 
the practical/motivational role that morality is supposed to play. However, my purpose in 
this paper is not to defend moral realism per se, but simply to suggest that realism can 
best accommodate the phenomenology of dirty hands described above when it is 
conjoined with pluralism. Moral realism might prove unattractive for a host of other 
independent reasons, but a pluralistic form of it at least has the virtue of making sense of 
why we feel and act the way we do in situations of tragic moral dilemmas. 
 To further clarify, let us understand “pluralism” in a specifically ontological 
sense. This represents a departure from how “pluralism” is typically used in moral 
philosophy, which is in a normative sense—for instance, as a recommendation about how 
we should judge or act with respect to morally different practices. Such pluralists will be 
respectful of moral differences (to a certain extent) on a variety of normative grounds: 
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perhaps because they believe that they are not epistemically justified in claiming to know 
which moral beliefs and practices are the right ones; or perhaps because they think that it 
is rude or even politically dangerous to insist on one single “right way.” Though the 
specifics may vary quite a bit, it is typically in this normative sense that pluralism is 
discussed in ethics.24 By contrast, ontological pluralism is less of a thesis about how we 
should live and act, and instead a thesis about what sorts of things exist. A moral version 
of ontological pluralism posits the existence of multiple moral values which cannot be 
conceptually reduced to one another, subsumed by any single higher-order value, or 
accommodated under any umbrella concept. 
 The conjunction of moral realism (as defined above) with an ontological 
pluralism of value has been a neglected option in metaethics. As we have seen, when 
pluralism is normally addressed, it is in a primarily normative sense. When pluralism is 
deployed ontologically—as by Wong, for instance—it is associated with metaethical 
relativism. According to pluralistic moral realism, though, there exists a multiplicity of 
nonetheless belief-independent values that are irreducible to one another. In this way, 
pluralistic moral realism would render the question that is often put to moral realists as to 
whether there is “a single moral value” misleading, conflating two distinct questions into 
one. Is there moral value? The pluralistic realist answers yes. Is this value singular? The 
pluralistic realist answers no. Thus, pluralistic moral realism acknowledges that the moral 
landscape might be messy and defiant of our desire to simplify it; and that it is 
anthropocentric hubris to think that moral reality must answer to our psychological need 
for parsimony. 
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One initial worry regarding pluralistic realism is that it fails to adequately 
differentiate itself from the relativist alternative defended by Wong, and so should not be 
properly called realism at all. For how can we say that moral value is “real” if there can 
be multiple conflicting values? This objection would have us view pluralistic realism as 
logically inconsistent. Ontological pluralism maintains that there could be two right 
things to do in a single situation because there could be two irreducible, but equally 
objective moral values operative in that situation which generate two different, 
incompatible moral considerations. Therefore (so goes the objection), pluralistic realism 
would appear to leave us in an impossible position: an agent should perform action Φ as 
dictated by value α, but at the same time the very same agent should perform action Ψ as 
dictated by value β, where Φ and Ψ are inconsistent and where α and β are inconsistent. 
However, this objection conflates two distinct ways in which propositions can be 
inconsistent. Logical inconsistency obtains just in case one proposition formally entails 
the negation of another proposition. Thus, the statements “My pen is blue” and “My pen 
is not blue” are logically inconsistent (provided we mean the same things by the terms in 
each sentence and that we are evaluating their truth from the same perspective, e.g. in the 
same light, etc.). The present objection would have us view conflicting moral obligations 
as similarly inconsistent: the sentence “I should save Rob from the axe-murderer” is as 
incompatible with the sentence “I should not save Rob from the axe-murderer” as are the 
two sentences about the color of my pen. 
 Of course, expressed in this way there is a logical inconsistency between the two 
moral propositions. The truth of one formally entails the negation of the other, such that 
we cannot think of both as true at the same time. However, this is a strawman of 
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pluralistic realism. The kind of intractable moral conflicts pluralistic realism wants to 
take seriously (e.g. those that confront Jim, Sophie, and the Star Trek officer), concern 
moral propositions whose truths are only practically inconsistent. For example, in Jim’s 
scenario, pluralistic realism maintains that there may be two moral obligations: (1) 
protect innocents and (2) do not commit murder. Fulfilling both of these obligations is 
impossible within the confines of Jim’s scenario. But this impossibility is characterized 
by practical, not logical inconsistency. There is no formal contradiction between the 
propositions “I should protect innocents” and “I should not commit murder,” as revealed 
by the fact that we can easily think of cases in which the two are conjoined, e.g. an 
innocent person is precisely someone whom I ought not to murder. If the conflicting 
moral obligations were expressed as “I should protect the innocent” and “I should not 
protect the innocent,” then there would be a logical inconsistency. But pluralistic realism 
need not (nor would any plausible theory) maintain that we have duties against protecting 
innocents. We may have countervailing considerations that outweigh protecting 
innocents, but this hardly constitutes a duty not to protect them ceteris paribus. Thus, 
pluralistic realism recognizes the existence of multiple, realist moral values which may 
generate incompatible moral obligations. But such conflicts are due to practical 
limitations, not logical or formal inconsistencies.25 
 However, even if the conflicting obligations of pluralistic realism are only 
practically inconsistent, can we really call a view “realist” if it affirms an infinite number 
of moral values? According to this objection, allowing more than one ultimate moral 
truth threatens to open the flood-gates, inundating our ontology with so many values as to 
effectively obviate the very meaning of “moral value.” Thus, pluralism risks backfiring 
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on realism, initiating a slippery-slope to the very relativism the view was trying to avoid. 
To arrest this slippery-slope, pluralistic realism will need to provide some standard that 
recognizes only a constrained amount of fundamental values in a non-arbitrary way. 
Fortunately, the pluralistic realist does not need to decide precisely which values 
are the real ones—although clearly a more detailed discussion of this issue would be 
necessary for a complete defense of the view. Indeed, a benefit of the realist position is 
that the proponent may assume a humble agnosticism about particular moral truths. For 
pluralistic realism is a thesis about the status of moral value, not necessarily about its 
content; the pluralistic realist claims only that there are belief-independent moral values, 
not that he or she necessarily knows what they are. 
As for the worry that the plurality of moral values could slippery-slope into 
affirming so many values as to effectively affirm none, it is encouraging to observe that it 
has so far been unrealized. Empirical research in social psychology and cross-cultural 
anthropology have given at least some reassurance that the plurality of moral values is 
constrained to a small, finite handful. Richard Shweder and Jonathan Haidt have argued 
that experimental moral psychology is moving increasing toward an affirmation of 
pluralism.26 Haidt has more recently collated fundamental values according to distinct 
“modules” and argues that different cultural practices and moral commitments seem 
generally be reducible to some combination or privileging of these basic values.27 
The specifics of such empirical arguments may be contested, and different 
anthropologists may gerrymander “modules” in somewhat different ways. But despite 
this, there are compelling hermeneutical reasons to assume that value-pluralism cannot 
vary radically, for the simple reason that we can understand most moral differences as 
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not only differences (which presupposes that we can make sense of them at least enough 
to categorize them as differences), but also frequently as moral. For example, though I 
might disagree with someone’s defense of the moral legitimacy of capital punishment, I 
do not thereby think such a defender is being nonsensical or necessarily immoral. I might 
understand and even morally appreciate the competing moral considerations and values 
operative in such a defense, even if I do not personally find such considerations or values 
salient or compelling. Or, to take another example, it may be the case that many 
Americans place less moral importance on social harmony or role expectations as might 
Japanese or Indian persons,28 but it’s not as if such values are thereby incomprehensible 
or utterly foreign as moral values.29 
 In addition, some of the discrepancy between different empirical accounts of 
pluralist values can also be accommodated by the recognition that the moral domain 
might permit of a degree of vagueness and indeterminacy. That is, plausible candidates 
for fundamental values (e.g. compassion) may be plastic enough to allow for multiple 
ways of framing and instantiating them (e.g. love, friendship, kindness, concern, 
sympathy, etc.). Richard Boyd has notably offered this sort of argument as part of his 
own defense of moral realism by characterizing moral predicates as “homeostatic 
property-clusters.”30 
 Finally, an advantage of pluralistic realism is that it charitably makes sense of the 
phenomenology of tragic moral dilemmas that has been explored above. Recall that 
certain scenarios of dirty hands seem generated by features of external states of affairs 
that seem to conspire to force agents to do something (or fail to do something) about 
which they would (or should) appropriately feel guilty. Pluralistic realism can resolve the 
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apparent paradox of claiming that agents ought to perform two mutually exclusive actions 
by characterizing the moral dilemma as an instance of conflict between two irreducible or 
incommensurable moral values. Thus, the reason why it makes sense for Jim, Sophie, or 
the Star Trek officer to agonize over their plight, and to feel guilty no matter which 
choice they make, is because they failed to fulfill a real obligation. The fact that they 
could not practically have fulfilled an obligation does not obviate the fact that they ought 
to have fulfilled it. Their hands are dirtied despite their best intentions, not because of a 
sacrifice made in the name of expediency or a greater good, but simply because le sale 
monde dooms them. 
 I argue that this phenomenology of intractable moral dilemmas (and the attendant 
feelings of guilt) are important aspects of our moral consciousness that are worth 
preserving in a plausible metaethical theory. If this is the case, then pluralistic realism has 
prima facie support. This is not to say that pluralistic realism has any sort of monopoly 
on moral guilt. Relativism or other monistic varieties of realism can also account for 
experiences of guilt. However, on the one hand, relativism would provide no compelling 
explanation of why we experience tragic moral dilemmas in the objectively-generated 
way we do, i.e. why we would not simply write it off as a relic of convention. And 
monistic realism, on the other hand, would fail to account for why we feel that competing 
moral considerations cannot be ranked or systematized in a way that obviates the 
dilemma. 
 So to summarize the argument in this section, we have attempted to take seriously 
the apparent reality that certain moral dilemmas are such that we are forced by the world 
to dirty our hands. These scenarios are experienced as both objective and irresolvable, 
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such that we even assess moral character on the basis of responses to this dirtiness. The 
under-appreciated conjunction of ontological pluralism with moral realism allows us to 
save and explain both these phenomena in a charitable way: we are forced to get our 
hands dirty when we are confronted with plural obligations which represent values that 
are equally real as well as practically inconsistent. 
 
V. The Limits of Moral Hygiene: Living with Dirty Hands 
 The metaethical position described above presents us with a deeply unforgiving 
and messy moral universe. Negotiating such a chaotic terrain without sullying one’s 
character by ever subverting a moral consideration will be either a matter of exceptional 
good luck or else exceptional moral blindness. What seems much more probable is that 
the vast majority of people are coerced into getting their hands dirty by inescapably 
subverting a moral consideration in some tragic dilemma. I have argued that this view has 
the following advantages: (1) it frames the phenomenon of dirty hands as a metaethical 
issue, and not merely a psychological or normative one; (2) it preserves and explains our 
intuitions about feeling guilty for not performing both options in an exclusive moral 
disjunction; and (3) it motivates an under-appreciated option in metaethical theory (viz. 
pluralistic moral realism) which can charitably do justice to all these explananda. 
 In this section, I conclude by briefly suggesting other possible advantages of 
pluralistic moral realism and its understanding dirty hands. For one thing, we have 
already seen examples of how guilt—even guilt that flies in the face of the “ought implies 
can” precept—can be motivationally and behaviorally efficacious. Recall the Amodio 
study discussed earlier about the positive repercussions of inherited racial guilt. 
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Furthermore, guilt about failures to perform inconsistent actions might help stimulate us 
to act better morally in the future. For a life with no feelings of guilt could too easily be 
associated with the illusion of moral perfection—a life in which we rest on our moral 
laurels. If morality only requires of us what we can do, then we arguably lose incentive to 
increase our capacities for action. In other words, we may be tempted to be complacent, 
confident that we have met our “moral quotas.” 
 The recognition of tragic dirty hands can also help instill in us a deeper sensitivity 
to the moral shortcomings of others. If situations of conflicting obligations reveal the 
difficulty (or even the practical impossibility) of moral perfection, it seems plausible that 
this could result in a feeling of solidarity since no one is morally perfect. Indeed, recall 
that for Aristotle, the katharsis of tragedy consists in a recognition that the tragic figure is 
both imperfect (thereby generating pity) as well as relevantly similar to one’s self 
(thereby generating the fear that such a tragedy could befall one’s self just as easily).31 
The tragic situations of dirty hands explicated by pluralistic realism might offer an 
analogue to Aristotelian katharsis: we often feel a beneficial camaraderie when we 
recognize that others go through difficulties—even impossibly tragic dilemmas—just as 
we do. After all, this seems to be a large part of the reason why support-groups seem to 
function as well as they do. 
 To conclude, I have argued that the phenomenon of dirty hands raises significant 
metaethical questions in addition to the psychological, normative and political ones 
which are typically the focus of discussion. Specifically, the metaethics of taking dirty-
hands scenarios seriously seems to be one in which the moral world itself is revealed as 
messy (le sale monde), forcing agents to dirty their hands in defiance of the “ought 
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implies can” principle. After appealing to a variety of thought-experiments as well as 
some empirical data, I argued that pluralistic moral realism can best accommodate and 
explain this metaethical dirtiness.  
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acting on the other, logical inconsistencies may be dodged. But again, the difference with 
this traditional monistic realism and the pluralist position I defend concerns the 
justification of the personalized guilt I have argued is morally significant: the monist’s 
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